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AGENTIC AND CONSCIENTIC DECISIONS IN LAW:
DEATH AND OTHER CASES
Laura S. Underkuffler*
I.

INTRODUCTION

When I was asked to contribute to this PropterHonoris R spectum
edition of the Notre Dame Law Review, which celebrates the work of
Professor Kent Greenawalt, my first thought was how to choose a particular focus for my Essay within the enormous and fascinating corpus
of Professor Greenawalt's work. Finally, I decided to choose the question that initially brought me to his work and on which I have found
his work immensely instructive ever since: the question of the legitimacy of the use of nonrational or "conscience'-based decisionmaking
as a part of law.
Throughout his career, Professor Greenawalt has explored the
processes of intellectual inquiry used in the development and application of law. In particular, his work has explored whether "nonrational" judgments-that is, judgments that are based on reasons that
cannot be articulated and/or that lack intersubjective validity-are
an appropriate basis for decisionmaking by citizens, legislators,
judges, and others involved in the legal decisionmaking processes of a
liberal democratic society.2 Although Professor Greenawalt has most
*

Professor of Law, Duke University.

1 See Kent Greenawalt, The Limits ofRationalityand the Place ofReligious Conviction:
ProtectingAnimals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1047 (1987).
2 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBjzcrrly (1992) [hereinafter GR'JANVALT, LAW AND OBJEaTIvrrl4

KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC

REASONS (1995) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES]; KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGIOUS CONvITIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); Kent Greenawalt, Groundsfor

PoliticalJudgment: The Status of PersonalExperience and the Autonomy and Generality of
Principles of Restraint, 30 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 647 (1993) [hereinafter Greenawalt,
Groundsfor PoliticalJudgment]; Kent Greenawalt, supra note 1; Kent Greenawalt, On
PublicReason, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669 (1994); Kent Greenawalt, Reason and Sympathetic Imagination,3 EMORY L.J. 9 (1980) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Sympathetic Imagination]; Kent Greenawalt, Religious Liberty and Democratic Politics, 23 N. Ky. L. REv. 629
(1996) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Religious Liberty].
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extensively addressed whether religious convictions3 are an appropriate basis for legal discourse and legal decisionmaking, 4 his work
powerfully illuminates the difficult questions that are involved in the
use of any kind of nonrational ground in the development and application of law.
In this Essay, I shall draw upon Professor Greenawalt's rich insights to construct what I see as two competing models of law and
legal decisionmaking. The first model, which I shall call the "agentic"
model, is that which we ordinarily use in law. Under this model, law
consists of societally established principles and the use of rational
processes to interpret or supplement those principles. This model of
law reflects the belief that law is a consensual enterprise, with its legitimacy rooted in societal acceptance of its norms and processes. The
principles and processes that this model of law uses are ones that are
societally articulated and societally understood; they are principles
and processes to which we (as a society) have collectively agreed.
Those who interpret and enforce law-such as judges, juries, and executive branch officials-are our agents: they interpret and enforce
the law as we (a society) have established it.
Although the agentic model is the one that we generally assume
should be used in law, there are times when this model of law fails.
There are times, for instance, when the principles of articulated law
are in irreconcilable conflict or when the matter is simply one about
which the law, as articulated, has seemingly not spoken. In these
cases, we are forced to resort to another model of law and legal decisionmaking. Under this model, which I shall call the "conscientic"
model, the legal decisionmaker determines not what the law (as societally established) is but rather what the law (as a matter of personal
belief or "conscience") should be. The costs that this model of law
entails for the consensual basis of law and the rule of law that flows
from it are obvious. As a result, this model of law may be used by
judges, juries, and others charged with the enforcement and interpretation of law only when one or more premises of the agentic model of
3 Greenawalt defines "religious" bases for decision as those "connected to theistic belief or other belief about a realm of ultimate value beyond, or deeper than,
ordinary human experience, or to forms of life or institutions understood to be religious, such as Buddhism or the Ethical Culture Society." GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 2, at 39.
4 As Greenawalt explains, although reasoned judgment plays an important part
in what most people believe is religious, many people's religious convictions rest at
least in part on elements "that are not fully subject to reasoned interpersonal evaluation." Id. at 87.
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law fail and decisionmakers are forced, as a practical matter, to use
this kind of decisionmaking.
This description of legal decisionmaking is quite congruent with
the law as we know it; at least, it is (as Professor Greenawalt notes)
what we think that law-as a general matter-should be. There is,
however, a small but troubling group of cases for which this understanding fails to account. These are cases in which conscientic decisionmaking is not a default rule, to which we reluctantly make limited
recourse when the agentic model fails, but is itself the model of law
thatjudges, jurors, and others are specifically commanded to enforce.
In these cases, legal decisionmakers are commanded by the law to determine what the result, as a matter of personal conscience, should
be-a command and a process that are completely inconsistent with
otherwise entrenched ideas about the content of law and the rule of
law. In this Essay, I shall examine this phenomenon, using (as an example) the Supreme Court's requirement that conscience-based or
"conscientic" decisionmaking be used as a part of the death-sentencing process. I shall argue that these cases are not in fact anomalous
errors in our law, as some have argued; rather, they are situations in
which the agentic model of law fails because of the substantive nature
of the decisions involved. I shall further argue that although the explicit use of the conscientic model of law in these cases carries great
dangers, it nonetheless serves an important purpose: it reminds us of
the limits of agentic decisionmaking and of what the law-as an institution-must, in the end, require.
I.

AGENTIC AND CONSCIENTIC DECISIOrMAKING: CONFLICrING

MODELS OF

LAW

When we consider the kinds of decisionmaking that are properly
used by a particular legal actor, we must first establish what the role of
that person in the legal process is. For instance, the desirability of the
use of particular grounds by those whose roles involve the creation or
change of law (such as legislators or citizens acting in their civic capacities) may well differ from the desirability of the use of the same
grounds by those whose roles do not.5 In this Essay, I shall focus on
5 How readily we embrace the use of nonrational or "nonpublic" reasons will
depend, in large part, on the individual's role in the lawmaking process. Greenawalt
concludes that private citizens, in a civic capacity, should generally feel free to rely on

private sources in both public discourse and private deliberations. Legislators should
rely upon public reasons in public discourse, but may rely on private sources in the
process of private decisionmaking. Judges "should strive hard to be guided by public
reasons," and they may rely on personal sources of judgment (including religious

beliefs) when public reasons provide no answer. See Greenawalt, Religious Liberty,
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those decisionmakers whose roles involve-as an explicit matter-the
interpretation and enforcement of law, such as judges, juries, and executive branch officials.
When we consider the grounds that are appropriately used by
those who interpret and enforce the law, we begin with an awareness
that law involves the coercive exercise of government power. Because
these persons make decisions that affect human lives, they face tasks
that are not present in other arenas. As Professor Greenawalt has written, 'Judges, unlike literary interpreters, need to decide on a best approach. Legal cases involve claimants. Judges make practical
decisions .... [] udges cannot throw up their hands and declare that
legal cases are ties." 6
As a result of this particular nature of law, we begin with the
premise that law is, fundamentally, a consensual enterprise; we agree
to be bound by the coercive and potentially violent power of law, because we believe that law implements (in a general way, at least) those
7
principles to which we have individually and collectively agreed.
Those principles are both substantive and procedural in nature; they
entail notions about what values-as a substantive matter-the society
holds, 8 and how-as a matter of process-we are to interpret and apply those values.
Legal analysis begins, then, with "widely shared assumption[s]" of
substantive value, such as the belief that the government should treat
supra note 2, at 637-41; see also GREENAWALT,

PRIVATE CONSCIENCES,

supra note 2, at

143-50 (describing circumstances under which judges may rely on personal moral
convictions); Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality-Institutionsof Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REV. 177, 210-22 (1981) (describing prosecutorial decisionmaking and

claims of "extra legal" or moral right).
6

Kent Greenawalt, Interpretation andJudgment, 9 YALEJ.L. & HuMAN. 415,422-23

(1997). As Robert Cover has written, "[j]udges deal pain and death." Robert M.
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609 (1986).
7 See KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND Moa~rrv 63 (1987) (discussing
how traditional social contract theory "tries to answer ... how a government can justly
have coercive powers over free individuals ....
This consent... involves acquiescence in actions of the government that are within the sphere of the authority
conferred").
8 See GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBjEcrrITY, supra note 2, at 169 (stating that

although we must sometimes deviate from existing community standards, "especially
when existing standards are believed to offend higher moral principles,"
"[d]iscrepancies between law and dominant cultural morality are sources of tension
and resentment" and tend "to threaten the effective functioning of legal norms");
Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CIUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 710,
711-12 (arguing that principles that guide legal regulation must include societally
determined moral judgments).
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similarly situated people equally,9 or that personal liberty should (if at
all possible) be preserved.10 These values, articulated in legal rules,
are the premises from which the interpretation and enforcement of
law begins. Using this body of basic rules and understandings, legal
decisionmakers use "existing modes of expression" and "accepted patterns of reason"1 ' to determine, in any particular situation, what the
result should be.
Although "reason" could be understood to involve many different
ways of knowing, in this context it is understood more narrowly. Professor Greenawalt writes that in legal analysis, "something can be established by reason if it can be demonstrated to any fair-minded and
appropriately intelligent and trained observer." 12 By saying that something can be "demonstrated," we mean that "the observer would end
up believing confidently in the proposition asserted and also believe
that he had good grounds"' 3 for that belief. Examples of accepted
legal reasoning include the statement of a legal rule and the application of that rule to facts in ways that a fair-minded person must agree
that the rule (by its letter or spirit) contemplates, or the statement of
a legal rule and a deductive proposition that a fair-minded person
4
must see as flowing from the original premise.'
The essential characteristics of this model of law can therefore be
distilled as follows. Under this model of law, we (as a society) identify
particular principles of value with which we generally agree; and from
these principles we authorize the use of rational processes to establish
subsidiary principles, or to make particular applications, that will answer questions posed by particular situations. Both the principles of
value and the processes used to work with them are articulable and
intersubjectively (demonstrably) valid.
As Professor Greenawalt notes, the use of legal rules or expressions of value in conjunction with reason in this sense "can often take
us very far"' 5 in law. Once the relevant facts are established, most applications of law can be determined through the use of deductive,
comparative, and other kinds of ordinary reasoning. Indeed, even significant conclusions in contested constitutional cases can be reached
using these methods. By illuminating various possibilities and the
strengths and weaknesses of particular arguments, reason-in con9
10
11
12
13
14
15

See GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 2, at
See id. at 37.
Greenawalt, Sympathetic Imagination, supra note 2, at 10.
Id at 13.
Id. at 14.
Seeiti
Id.

28.
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junction with previously
1 6 established values-can be a powerful determinant in such cases.
It is apparent, however, that this kind of decisionmaking cannot
resolve all of the issues that the interpretation and enforcement of law
involve; and it is in the probing of legal decisionmaking beyond this
boundary that Professor Greenawalt's work has been most powerful.
The situations in which this model of law will fail have been explored
by Professor Greenawalt in a rich body of work. For instance, there
are matters about which the law has seemingly not spoken, or about
which it "cannot speak both universally and correctly"; in these cases,
the law (as we have described it) is at best a set of "guiding criteria,"
with the decisionmaker to provide "supplementary, particularistic
judgments" that the cases demand.' 7 In other cases, the relevant variables may be so complex that they cannot be adequately captured by
rational sources, 18 or there may be an undeniable need to consider
changing social conditions and other values in the application of legal
norms. 19 Reliance upon consensually established principles and rational arguments from those principles will also fail when decisionmaking involves an issue as to which no present consensus exists, 20 or
16 See id. at 14-15.
17 Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 187.
18 For instance, whether a candidate for naturalization is of "good moral character," whether a criminal defendant acted "reasonably," and whether a punishment is
"cruel and unusual" are questions that few would argue can be determined "from the
corpus of law itself, even if that corpus is taken to include the various principles and
theories that help explain it." GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECrIVrIY, supra note 2, at

188-90.
19 See id. at 190.
20 In such cases, the law may articulate no relevant values, or those values that are
articulated may conflict. See id. at 214-15.
In an article that is most powerful and disturbing to our moral complacency,

Greenawalt argues that legal questions founded on the moral status of animals and
the environment present challenges such as these to the conventional, "explicitly consensual" model of lawmaking. For instance, "It] he uniqueness of some human capac-

ities and the superiority of others hardly seems adequate tojustify according no moral
significance to the interests of other animals." Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1027. And
"[u]nless one puts the justification in terms of psychological health or in terms of a
needed corrective to present human ignorance of future possibilities, the claim that

people should respect nature in its own right and should try to preserve species is not
one that can be grounded successfully in rational argument." Id. at 1039. In these
cases, "[p]eople have radically different reactions to what humans owe to nature in a

larger sense, and neither analogies to ordinary moral constraints nor other forms of
rational analysis provide much assistance in settling the issue." Id. Individuals are left,
instead, to sources such as "visions that concern the 'ultimate meaning' of human life
and the place of mankind in the universe." Id. at 1041; see also GREENAWALT, LAW AND
OBjEcnvry, supranote 2, at 181 (stating that there may be "sound criteria of correct-
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when the decision-although enjoying, perhaps, some kind of actual
consensus-is based upon arguments or factors that are incapable of
demonstrated intersubjective validity or even interpersonal
2
articulation. '
The prospect that this model of law may fail, and that those who
interpret and enforce the law may be forced to consult other, more
"personal" sources, leaves us with a sense of profound disquiet.22 The
reason for this disquiet is found in law's consensual foundation. If (as
we stated above) law is a consensual enterprise, with its legitimacy
rooted in societal acceptance of its processes and norms, the idea that
those who enforce the law will sometimes rely on judgments whose
bases have not been accepted by others-indeed, whose bases have not
even been articulated to others-is deeply and inherently troubling. As
Professor Greenawalt has written, we generally believe that
"j]udgments or feelings that ... have no generalizability[ ] should
not underlie political coercion." 23 Although such personal sources
might be used by individuals whose roles involve the creation or
change of law (for instance, legislators or citizens involved in the political process), the compatibility of this kind of decisionmaking with the
roles of those who are charged with enforcing the law (for instance,
judges, juries, or executive branch officials) is a very different matter.
With personal decisionmaking comes the danger of arbitrariness, the
use of prohibited factors, and the violation of the very values that the
24
law (as a consensual matter) has established.
Our reluctance to endorse the use of such grounds by those who
interpret and enforce the law reveals an essential characteristic of
ness that are neither purely objective nor wholly culture dependent, but which reach
beyond what common reason can discover").
21 See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1049, 1051; see also Kent Greenawalt, Natural
Law and Political Choice: The GeneralJustificationDefense-Criteriafor PoliticalAction and
the Duty to Obey the Law, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 35 (1986) ("[T]here are many fundamental questions of morality that are critical for the appropriate boundaries of legal
protection for which rational secular morality cannot provide any single persuasive
answer .... [In such a case] every citizen must resolve (the question] on the basis of
some nonrational judgment, a judgment that is not irrational or against reason, but
which goes beyond what rationality can establish.") (footnote omitted).
22 For instance, Greenawalt concludes that those who are charged with the enforcement of law should use consensually established principles and rational arguments when those sources yield answers to the problems at hand; only when they do
not are "personal," nonrational grounds a legitimate part of the decisionmaking process. See Greenawalt, Groundsfor PoliticalJudgment,supra note 2, at 669.
23 GREENAWALT, PrIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 2, at 36.
24 See, e.g., id. at 36 ("The inappropriateness of relying on... personalized judgments is most obvious for decisions within the law. Part of the ideal of the rule of law
is uniform and nonarbitrary decision under legal standards.").
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decisionmaking under the prevailing model of law which we have established: it is, at its core, agentic in nature. This model assumes that
those who are charged with the enforcement of law will implement
the law as societally cast and societally desired; that they will not, on
the basis of "conscience" 2 5 or some similar notion, decide-of their
own accord-what the law should be. 26 The prevailing or "agentic"
model of law assumes that when officials confront uncertainty in articulated law, they should use rational processes to determine what
the result-from a societalpoint of view-should be. In their interpretation and enforcement of law, such persons are constrained by the
moorings of societal values and societal desires. For such persons to
engage in "conscientic" decisionmaking-for them to decide what,
from their own points of view, the law should be-is entirely contrary to
the rule of law. Indeed, it is for this reason that reference to personal
moral conviction is generally considered to be incompatible with the
expected processes of judicial decisionmaking, even when the actual
27
decisions reached are ones of which we would otherwise approve.
We do not generally see judges as roving, self-appointed "moral
agents."
What cannot be explained by this model of law are those few
cases found in law in which those charged with the interpretation and
enforcement of law are specifically commanded to make personal,
"moral" inquiry. In these cases, the law fails to establish the standards
that those who interpret and enforce the law should use, and instead
commits the decision to the decisionmaker's "conscience." To invite
decisionmakers to determine, as a matter of conscience, what standards should be used or what decisions should be made seems to be
strikingly at odds with law as we know it. It contradicts not only the
agentic role that we expect, but also the very idea of law as something
with substantive content which we-as a society-have agreed to en25 The core idea of conscience has been defined as "the idea of a capacity, commonly attributed to most human beings, to sense or immediately discern that what he
or she has done, is doing, or is about to do (or not do) is wrong, bad, or worthy of

disapproval." Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Four Conceptions of Conscience, in NoMos XL:

INTEc-

RrrY and CONSCIENCE 13, 14 (Ian Shapiro & Robert Adams eds., 1998). Popular con-

ceptions of conscience include those rooted in theological beliefs about human
agency, those that see conscience as an unreflective response to societally instilled
values, and those that see conscience as reflective decisionmaking that compares our
proposed actions with our (independently determined) set of moral values. See id. at
14-17.
26

Cf

STANLEY

MILGRAM,

OBEDIENCE

TO AuTHORT. AN

ExpERIMENTAL ViEW

132-33 (1974) (contrasting agentic and autonomous decisionmaking in social
organizations).
27 See GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 2, at 142.
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force. The notion that the content of law is something that decisionmakers must themselves determine seems to render the idea of law,
the consensual basis of law, and the institution of law, internally-and
radically-incoherent.
How can we explain these instances of commanded "conscientic"
decisionmaking in law? Are they simply additional situations in which
the agentic model of law fails for practical reasons and, thus, these
conscientic commands simply direct the decisionmakers to do (on an
authorized basis) what they would have had to have done (on an unauthorized basis) anyway? Or do they illuminate another, more critical way in which the agentic model of law may fail-something which
we are forced to confront, "as a matter of conscience," by these cases?
To explore these questions, let us consider one of the most wellknown examples of commanded conscientic decisionmaking found in
law: the charge to a criminal jury to consider, "as a matter of conscience," the penalty of death.
Il.

To KuLL, OR NOT TO KILL: CONscEENTIc DECISIONMAKING

IN

SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

The tension between the agentic model of law and a decisionmaker's use of personal conscience can be illustrated by a simple
case. In 1978, an Oklahoma state court jury was deciding the fate of
Robyn Leroy Parks. Parks had killed a man, and the jury was considering whether Parks should, in turn, be killed. In his closing argument,
the prosecutor attempted to assure the jury:
[Mou're not yourself putting Robyn Parks to death. You just have
become a part of the criminal justice system that says when anyone
does this, that he must suffer death. So all you are doing is you're
just following the law, and what the law says, and on your verdictonce your verdict comes back in, the law takes over. The law does
all of these things, so it's not on your conscience. You'rejust part of
the criminal justice system that says when this type of thing happens, that whoever does such a horrible, atrocious thing must suffer
death. Now that's man's law .... [But] God's law says that the
murderer shall suffer death. So don't let it bother your conscience,
you know.

28

In other words, the prosecutor told the jury: 'Yours is strictly an agentic task. Your task is not to decide what the law is or should be. You are
not to make some kind of personal moral inquiry. You are simply to
apply the law-those principles that society, as a whole, has estab28 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 512 n.13 (1990) (quoted by Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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lished-to the facts in this case, in a rational manner. Beyond that,
the responsibility is not-and should not be-yours."
In fact, the law of capital sentencing is considerably more complex. 29 In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has created a conceptually bifurcated procedure which must be followed by the
sentencing authority in these cases. Although an agentic model of law
is assumed in part, a conscientic model of law is also articulated and
enforced in these cases.
Under the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, we begin
with the principle that a state sentencing scheme must establishthrough some kind of articulated criteria-those persons who, as a
class, are potentially eligible for the penalty of death. 30 This class
must be articulated more precisely than by a simple statement that all
who commit a capital offense are eligible for death. 3 1 Permissible
schemes include those that list both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and require the sentencer to weigh them against each
other;32 those that list aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but
33
give no guidance once an aggravating circumstance has been found;
and those that present special questions to the sentencer, with the
eligibility for death turning-mandatorily-on the answers to those
34
questions.
The goal of these requirements is to eliminate what once had
been completely unfettered discretion in capital sentencing and to
bring the process into line with the idea of the rule of law. As one
legal writer has summarized the motivating sentiment, "The rule of
law requires some appreciable sense of consistency, predictability, and
even-handedness when the state applies its coercive power, especially
its ultimate power [to kill]." ' 3 5 Consistent with this objective, the
Court has stated that the state sentencing scheme must "establish rational criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to
whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet the
29

In Parks' case, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of his claim, hold-

ing that habeas relief was barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See Saffle;
494 U.S. at 487-95.
30 See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (stating that the state sentencing scheme "must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder") (footnote omitted).
31 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
32 See, e.g., Proffitt v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
33 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
34 See, e.g.,
35 Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain From Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing,
81 CORNELL L. RE,. 989, 997 (1996).
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[required] threshold."8 6 There must be a "principled way to distinguish [a case] . ..in which the death penalty was imposed, from the
37
many cases in which it was not."
The extent that societally articulated principles can determine
such questions is, of course, necessarily limited; no list of factors, however detailed, can anticipate all of the facts and circumstances that
capital crimes present. In determining whether a particular defendant is eligible for death, or is a member of the class for which death is
possible, the sentencer will "unavoidably exercise a range ofjudgment
and discretion. '38 This exercise is controlled, however, by "clear and
objective standards"; 39 the sentencing scheme must "guide[ ] and focus[ ] the... [sentencer's] objective consideration" of the facts and
40
circumstances of the case.
In making this first, "eligibility" decision, 4 1 sentencers are clearly
agentic actors. The state, "representing organized society," directs
and controls the sentencer's actions 42 through the articulation of substantive principles and the authorized use of rational processes.4 3
Sentencers are to apply the law as given by others-they are not to
determine what the law, as a matter of conscience or personal belief,
should be.4
If a particular defendant is found to be a member of the class
eligible for death, the sentencer must make the second or "selection"
decision. 45 In this decision, the sentencer decides whether the de36 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987).
37 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality opinion).
38 Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 46 (1980).
39 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, J]J.) (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d, 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).
40 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens,

JJ.).
41 See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994).
42 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, J]J.).
43 The process to be used by the sentencer has been described as the application
of "'reasoned judgment ... in light of the totality of the circumstances present.'"
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 963 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Elledge
v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1003 (Fla. 1977)).
44 Occasionally, the Court lapses into articulations that are potentially inconsistent with this role; for instance, in discussing the death-eligibility decision, the Court
has stated that "[ilt is entirely fitting for the moral factual, and legal judgment of
judges and juries to play a meaningful role in sentencing." Barclay, 463 U.S. at 950
(plurality opinion) (emphasis added). If this statement anticipates that the decisionmaker will consult community moral standards for guidance, it is compatible with
an agentic role. If it anticipates that the decisionmaker will consult personal moral

standards, it is not.
45

See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 974.
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fendant should be one of those within the eligible class who is actually
selected for execution. As a part of this inquiry, a capital defendant is
constitutionally entitled to present "any relevant circumstance" 46 that
might cause the sentencer to decline to impose the penalty of death,
and the sentencer's discretion in considering this evidence cannot be
channeled.
Indeed, the sentencer may not be precluded from considering,
nor may the sentencer refuse to consider, relevant mitigating evidence.47 At this stage, whether the defendant "deserves" death, as an
individual, is the critical question; 48 the sentencer must be able to
consider, and must actually consider, "the individual circumstances of
the defendant, his background, and his crime" in making that
49
determination.
Focus on the defendant "as a 'uniquely individual human being[ ] '"50 in deciding whether he should live or die is deeply rooted in
another principle: that the selection of an individual for death is
based upon the "moral culpability" of that person. 51 The death penalty exists, in the words of Justice Stevens, "as an expression of the
community's outrage-its sense that an individual has lost his moral
entitlement to live." 52 As a consequence, "capital punishment rests on
46 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987). But cf.Buchanan v. Angelone,
118 S. Ct. 757, 761 (1998) ("[T]he State may shape and structure the jury's considera-

tion of mitigation so long as it does not preclude the jury from giving effect to any
relevant mitigating evidence.").

47
48

See Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 761; Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 (1991).
See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 34 (1986) (opinion of White, Black-

mun, Stevens & O'Connor, JJJ.); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 489 (1984) (Ste-

vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 460. Becaule of this Eighth Amendment requirement, socalled "mandatory statutes"-under which all defendants guilty of aggravated murder

are condemned to death-are unconstitutional. SeeWoodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
50 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,504 (1987) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304
(plurality opinion)).
51 Id; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (stating that decision
to execute a criminal defendant depends upon the "moral guilt" of the accused).
Members of the Court have occasionally objected to this focus. However, they have
generally argued that moral guilt should be considered with other factors, not that
moral guilt is irrelevant to the selection decision. See, e.g., Booth, 482 U.S. at 520

(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T] he principle upon which the Court's opinion rests-that
the imposition of capital punishment is to be determined solely on the basis of moral
guilt-does not exist, neither in the text of the Constitution, nor in the historic practices of our society, nor even in the opinions of this Court ....[T] he human suffering the defendant has inflicted" should be considered, as well.) (emphasis added).
52 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part) (footnote omitted); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion
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not a legal but an ethical judgment-an assessment of [the defendant's] ... 'moral guilt.' ,,53 In describing the process by which individuals are selected for this "awesome punishment,"5 4 the Court
reiterates, time and again, that an exercise of moral judgment is involved. Selection of individuals for death involves not "individualized
inquiry" but "individualized moral inquiry";55 the decision involves not
"individualized judgment" but "individualized moraljudgment"; 56 the
facts considered by the sentencer must have not "direct relevance" but
"direct moral relevance"; 57 the sentencer must determine not that the
defendant is "deserving" of death but that he is " m orally deserving" of
death; 58 and so on.
The moral judgment that the sentencer must make is, moreover,
a profoundly personal one. Although the Court has repeatedly stated
that "it is the function of the sentencing jury to 'express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death,"' 59 it is dear that the members of the jury are not to determine, on some agentic basis, what the moral judgment of the community would be. Rather, the community's conscience in these cases is
expressed through the exercise of conscience by each individual juror.60 Indeed, "it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to
of Stewart, Powell & Stevens,JW.) ("[C]apital punishment is an expression of society's
moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.").
53 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Cf Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 506 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The decision
whether to impose the death penalty represents a moral judgment about the defendant's culpability, not a factual finding.").
54 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 336 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Saffle, 494 U.S. at 492-93 (appropriateness of the death penalty
is "'a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant'") (quoting California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) .
56 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 337 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
57 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 838 (1991) (SouterJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
58 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
59 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)) (emphasis added).
60 See Garvey, supra note 35, at 1003 n.56 ("Capital sentencing juries are said to
represent the 'conscience of the community.' However, they 'represent' the community only because they are members of the community, not because they discern and
then apply community standards."); see also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 302
(1971) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[U]nder California law it is error to charge that the
jury's verdict should express the conscience of the community; the jury should be
told, instead, that the verdict must 'express the individual conscience of each juror.'")
(quoting People v. Harrison, 381 P. 2d 665, 671 (Cal. 1963)); Stanton D. Krauss, Rep-
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believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of
'61
the defendant's death [is not a personal one, and] rests elsewhere."
As the Court has explained:
[T]his Court's ...

jurisprudence has [assumed] .

.

. that capital

sentencers would view their task as the serious one of determining
whether a specific human being should die at the hands of the State
.... [It is assumed] "thatjurors confronted with the truly awesome
responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with
due regard for the consequences of their decision[s]" . . . .
[Capital sentencing jurors are] called on to make a very difficult
and uncomfortable choice. They are confronted with evidence and
argument on the issue of whether another [human being] should
die, and they are asked to decide that issue on behalf of the
community. 62

Death sentencers must be personally aware of "the gravity of their
choice [s] and . . . the moral responsibility reposed in

them as

6

sentencers." 3
The incompatibility of this kind of conscientic decisionmaking
with the values that underlie the rule of law has been the subject of
extensive controversy. Generally, the problem has been seen as a perceived inconsistency between the requirement that the sentencer's
discretion be "channeled" or "controlled" in the "eligibility" phase
and the requirement that the sentencer must be permitted to exercise-and must in fact exercise-the uncontrolled prerogatives of individual conscience in the "selection" phase of the proceedings. As
Justice Scalia has written,
The latter requirement quite obviously destroys whatever rationality
and predictability the former requirement was designed to achieve.
[O]nce one says each sentencer must be able to answer "no" for
whatever reason [he] deems morally sufficient (and indeed, for
whatever reason any one of 12 jurors deems morally sufficient), it
becomes impossible to claim that the Constitution requires consistency and rationality [in] . . . sentencing determinations ... . 64
Indeed, despite the efforts by some members of the Court to clothe
these conscientic directives in agentic terms-for instance, by referresenting the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and CapitalSentencing, 64 IND. LJ. 617, 617-18 (1989).
61 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
62 Id. at 329-30, 333 (quoting McGautha, 402 U.S. at 208 (1971)).
63 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1011 (1983).
64 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664-65, 666 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted).
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ring to the selection process as one involving a "reasoned moral judgment ' 65 or a "reasoned moral response" 66-it

is apparent that the

Court has decided, in these cases, that the benefits of the agentic
model of law should be sacrificed for something else. All of the
problems that the agentic model of law attempts to avoid-such as
arbitrary, capricious, race-based, or similar kinds of decisionmakingare recognized dangers in death penalty cases. 67 Yet, despite these
dangers, and despite sharp criticism by colleagues and commentators,68 a majority of Justices has persisted in this approach.
65 See, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 316 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
66 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). These efforts have been
derided by Justice Scalia, who has written that under the Court's standard,
the jury may decide without ... guidance whether [the defendant] ...
"lacked the moral culpability to be sentenced to death,"... "did not deserve
to be sentenced to death," ... or "was not sufficiently culpable to deserve the
death penalty .... The Court seeks to dignify this by calling it a process
that calls for a "reasoned moral response" ... ,-but reason has nothing to
do with it.... It is an unguided, emotional "moral response" that the Court
demands be allowed...
Ia at 359 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell
& Stevens, J]J.) (stating that discretion in sentencing involves "the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (observing that discretionary capital sentencing systems may
operate, in practice, in a manner that discriminates against racial minorities and
other unpopular groups). AsJustice Douglas has written, "'It is the poor, the sick, the
ignorant, the powerless and the hated who are executed.' One searches our chronicles in vain for the execution of any member of the affluent strata of this society. The
Leopolds and the Loebs are given prison terms, not death." Furman, 408 U.S. at
251-52 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting RAMsEY CaARK, CRIME IN AMERcA 335
(1970)) (footnote omitted).
Occasionally the Court attempts to minimize these dangers, stating, for instance,
that "the isolated decision of ajury to afford mercy does not render unconstitutional
death sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced under a system that
does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJJ.). The fact that such discretionary decisionmaking is limited to those who have been previously found (on other grounds) to
be a part of the death-eligible class does not, however, make that arbitrariness less
troubling.
68 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 662-74 (1990) (ScaliaJ., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); William S. Geimer &Jonathan Amsterdam,
hyJurors Vote Life orDeath: Ten OperativeFactors in Ten FloridaDeath Penalty Cases, 15
AM.J. CRim. L. 1, 6-7, 53-54 (1988); Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort
Them Out? Refining the IndividualizationRequirement in CapitalSentencing, 102 YALE L.J.
835, 859-66 (1992).
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The Court has attempted to justify the use of conscientic decisionmaking in death cases on various grounds. For instance, the
Court has argued that the selection decision involves factors that are
too complex to be captured in articulated rules. "To identify before
the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and supplied by the
sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present
human ability. '69 Although originally articulated in McGautha v. California, an opinion which upheld a completely standardless sentencing
scheme, 70 the impossibility of capturing those circumstances that
merit death in articulated rules has been echoed in more recent cases
as the justification for using standardless, conscientic decisionmaking
71
in the selection phase of the death-sentencing process.
The difficulty that death cases present in this regard is, however,
a difficulty that is routinely faced in law. It is obvious that whatever
principles comprise the foundational rules of law, situations will arise
in which simple recourse to those principles will not provide an answer. In such cases, the decisionmaker is authorized (under the agentic model of law) to use rational methods to determine what, all things
considered, the law demands. 7 2 In those few cases where rational
methods fail, nonrational methods might be employed; 73 however,
even then, the decisionmaker must attempt to determine what is societally cast and societally desired, not what he-as a personal matterbelieves the law should be. Simple inability of principles articulated
by law to answer all questions or to capture all conceivable factors
does not, of itself, cause us to jettison the agentic model of law and to
adopt a conscientic one. Simply because we cannot specify, precisely,
69 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971).
70 In McGautha, the Court upheld a state sentencing scheme which provided no
standards for the sentencing authority at any stage of the proceeding. Id. at 196-208.
Such a scheme would, of course, no longer pass Eighth Amendment muster. Under
later Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, standards of some sort must define the
death-eligible class and must govern a defendant's inclusion in that class; only the
selection of a particular, death-eligible defendant for execution is a standardless (conscientic) decision. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Furman, 408 U.S. at 238 (per curiam).
71 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (stating
that discretion in capital sentencing is required in order to permit the sentencer to
evaluate the unique factors involved in each case); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222 (White, J.,
concurring) (claiming that mercy in capital cases involves "factors too intangible to
write into a statute").
72 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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what "negligence" is, or what "due process" is, or what "pain and suffering" (as elements of damage) are worth, we do not throw up our
hands and instruct the decisionmaker to "use her conscience" to decide. We assume that what is desired or best, from a collective point
of view, can be reasonably determined; we assume that agentic decisionmaking in these cases is possible and will be done, despite the
law's indeterminacy.
The Court has also located the reason for standardless decisionmaking in the selection stage of death penalty proceedings in the severity and finality of the penalty of death. "[T]he penalty of death,"
the Court has written, "is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long";74 " [ i] t is unique in its severity and irrevocability."75 As a result of this uniqueness, it is particularly critical that
the correct decision in each case be made, and correctness requires
that all factors, circumstances, and aspects of the case be heard and
76
weighed, without hindrance, by the sentencer.
The fact that we, as a society, must be careful before taking someone's life is hardly subject to dispute; indeed, many would say that the
severity of death, and the inevitability of decisionmakers' human errors, should preclude the use of the sentence of death altogether.
The critical nature of this concern does not, however, of itself explain
why decisionmakers should use a conscientic standard rather than an
agentic one. The question here is not whether care should be taken
when measuring the particular defendant and his crime against the
criteria for death; the question is, rather, whether those criteria-used
in the death decision-are the product of a societal standard or a personal one. Indeed, one might argue (as many critics have) that standards that are articulated, public, and universally applied are more

74 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion).
75 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJJ.).
76 As the Court has explained:
The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of
respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in
noncapital cases ....The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for
individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the

death sentence.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
Accordingly, "the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, [may] not be ...
precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor,any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604 (footnotes omitted).
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likely to yield "reliably" just results77 than secret, personal, nonarticu-

lated ones. The individualized determination, which the penalty of
death concededly requires, could certainly be made on the basis of
societal standards and societal desires; there is no reason why the desire to avoid error means that this decision must be a conscientic one.
It is my belief that the nature of the death decision does explain
why this decision is, and must be, a conscientic one, but that explanation is different from those that the Court gives. It inheres in the
substantive nature of the death decision and reveals another, latent
failure that we may find in the agentic model of law.
IV.

DEATH,

AND OTHER CASES: WHY THE

AGENTIC

MODEL OF

LAW FAILs

The reason that I shall postulate for the use of conscientic decisionmaking in death penalty cases is unarticulated, but latent, in every
sentence and paragraph of the Court's opinions that enforce this approach. The reason is this: when someone is sentenced to deathwhen an individual is deliberately and purposefully killed by the
state-we must, in the end, have an individualwho is accountable for
doing so.
The decision to kill another human being in a cool, deliberate,
and dispassionate manner is abhorrent to our most basic instincts.
There is a powerful natural disinclination to the taking of human life,
an in-built taboo against intraspecies destruction.78 Our instinctual
aversion to killing is particularly strong when it is done under detached and controlled conditions, with no passion of the moment to
justify the action. The truth of this fact is perhaps no more clear than
when one considers how often those involved in state-ordered killing
wish to dissociate themselves, personally, from the process. Prosecutors insist that they simply enforce the law, a law that is made by
others. 79 Jurors claim that under the law, as given by the judge, they
had no choice but to vote for death-despite clear instructions to the
contrary.8 0 Trial judges who impose death sentences claim determin77 See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05 (plurality opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
305 (plurality opinion).
78 See, e.g., DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING
TO KILL IN MODERN SOCIETY (1995).

79 See, e.g., Michael Leonard & Robert Robertson, "Interviews: The Prosecutors,"
in The Death Penalty: Personal Perspectives, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 14, 15, 18 (1990)
[hereinafter Death Penalty] (describing prosecutors' views that enforcement of the
death penalty was simply a "part of their duties"; whether the death penalty statute
was "an appropriate statute" was a question properly left to the legislature).
80 As one investigating scholar reported:
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istic powers for "the evidence" and "the law"; 8 ' governors, who have
powers of commutation leave the decisions "to the courts";8 2 and corrections officials, who carry out the sentences, cite the fact that the

Although each [juror] had participated in a relatively open-ended weighing
process,juror afterjuror told me that the judge's instructions required them
to impose death. [One said that] "[t]he instructions that we received ....
didn't leave any room for choices." The forewoman of ajury that returned a
death verdict told me almost defiantly that "we were trying desperately to
find something in his favor." Another told me three times that the death
penalty was a "requirement" in the case in which he was the foreman ....
One juror reported, "I didn't want to do it, but I had to." Another explained, "You can feel sorry and sadness for what you have to do but you still
have to do it. That is part of discipline." ... These accounts confirm the
hypothesis of social scientists that jurors who [have] imposed death would
readily characterize the decision as one required by the applicable law in
order to minimize their sense of personal responsibility.
Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to KilL Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to Capital
Jurors,1994 Wis. L. Rxv. 1345, 1376-77 (footnotes omitted); see also Mark Costanzo &
Sally Costanzo, The Death Penalty:Public Opinions, Legal Decisions, andJurorPerceptions,
in VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 246, 264-65 (Mark Costanzo & Stuart Oskamp eds., 1994)
(describing how many jurors who imposed death were able to discount their own
sense of responsibility for the verdict). As one juror stated, "We weren't saying he'll
get the death-we were just answering the questions. It was more comforting to focus
on the questions." Id. at 265 (footnote omitted).
Jurors also often discount the importance of their decisions on the theory that
later appeals will prevent any actual executions. See, e.g., Geimer & Amsterdam, supra
note 68, at 22 (quotingjuror who voted for death: "I would have held out on the guilt
phase if I had known he would be electrocuted. The word was he wouldn't be electrocuted."); Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors:Juror Misperceptions ConcerningParolein the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv.
211, 213 n.3 (1987) (citing studies that suggest that many jurors do not believe that
any death sentence rendered will actually be carried out).
81 See, e.g., Seth Kaberon, "Interviews: Judges," in Death Penalty, supra note 79, at
34, 36, 38 (citing statements by judges that death cases are determined by the evidence and that the judge "[doesn't] have any control over the evidence," and "as a
judge [is] sworn to uphold the law ... [he] must impose death in the proper
circumstances").
82 See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Inheritingthe Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 7, 17 (1992) (reporting attitudes of state
governors that executions are "the moral responsibility of Supreme Court justices");
see also HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEwrrNEss AccoUNT OF THE DEATH
PENALT" IN THE UNrrED STATES 169 (1993) (discussing statement by a member of the
state pardon board that members of the board "hadn't made the law and.., were not
personally responsible for this man, or any man, dying in the electric chair").
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decisions to kill are made, in fact, by others.8 3 The result, in the end,

84
is that someone dies, but "no one ... appears to do the killing."

Indeed, some have argued that it is precisely this ability to distance themselves from the results of their actions that enables many of
these actors to be a part of the death penalty process.8 5 Studies have
shown that among those persons in the general population who express support for capital punishment and a readiness to convict (in a
proper case), only a minority would be willing to personally pull the
83

As one corrections official explained:
I look at it this way. I've made peace with myself on this thing by knowing
that the fellow that's being executed has had every chance of appeal. He's
had his trials; the number of appeals the guy has had-the United States
Supreme Court three times, Eighth Circuit three times, the local court of
appeals three or four times. When you know that the case has been scrutinized that closely, then it makes you feel much easier. I believe in the laws
of our country.

STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE EXECUTION PROTOCOL: INSIDE AMERICA'S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT INDUSTRY 113 (1992) (interview with Bill Armontrout, former warden of the

Missouri State Penitentiary). As Trombly writes succinctly in the forward to his book,
"All the principal real-life characters of this book have one thing in common: [tihey
have taken human life." Id at viii.
84 VictoriaJ. Palacios, Faithin Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Commutation
to EnsureJusticein Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REv. 311, 365 (1996).
85 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of CapitalPunishment, 109 HAiv. L. REv. 355,
435 (1995) ("The diffusion of moral responsibility that occurs when a decision is perceived (correctly or not) to be divided among a number of participants ...affects all
participants in the decisionmaking process, which in the capital context includes everyone from law enforcement agents to the actual executioners.").
The extent to which death penalty actors actually succeed in this "distancing" is
questionable. Studies of those who have served on capital juries have found that years
later, many exhibit remorse, sorrow, nightmares, insomnia, and posttraumatic stress
disorder. See Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 80, at 268-69; Geimer & Amsterdam,
supra note 68, at 35, 36, 46. One corrections official described his response to the
supervision of an execution in the following terms:
After it's all over, you feel like you want to go wallow in mud. Because
although you didn't do it personally and even though you don't want to be
perceived a total liberal or soft on crime, which everybody seems to think
you are if you even say you believe there is another option, you feel like you
sort of degraded yourself, and you feel sorry for the people who had to actually carry out the execution. At the same time you have concern and compassion for the victims of violent crime, but nobody said we had to like to kill
people. There is nothing in the law says that you have to like killing
somebody.
IAN GRAY & MOIRA STANLEY,

A

PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME: AMERICANS SPEAK

OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 115 (1989) (interview with William Leeke, retired

head of the South Carolina Department of Corrections).
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lethal injection lever or flip the switch for the electric chair8 6 As one
juror who voted for death put it, "I don't think anyone would vote for
the death penalty if [he] had to do it."87 For those who must actually
execute the condemned person, the achievement of distancing is undoubtedly difficult. In recognition of this fact, the opportunity for
distancing is mechanically provided. In most methods of execution in
use today, multiple actors are involved-most of whose actions (in
fact) kill, but one of whose actions (in fact, and unknown) does not. 88
Because of our instinctual aversion to the deliberate killing of a
member of the human race, the judicial decision to kill requires an
act of particular psychological power: it requires the breaking of our
human identification with the condemned person, 8 9 a real and sym86

See Robert M. Bloom, American Death Penalty 0pinion, 1936-1986: A CriticalEx-

amination of the Gallup Polls, in THE DEATH

PENALTY IN AM-ERCA: CURRENT RESEARCH

122, 137-39 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991); Robert M. Bohm et al., Knowledge and Death
Penalty Opinion: A Panel Study, 21 J. GRIM. JuST. 29, 35 (1993).
87 Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 80, at 269.
88 As the method of lethal injection used in North Carolina was recently
described:
Central Prison uses three people to carry out an execution by lethal
injection.
Each one operates a plunger connected to an intravenous tube. They
inject a sedative, which puts the condemned person to sleep, and a lethal
dose of Pavulon, a muscle relaxant that paralyzes the heart and lungs. Two
tubes go to the inmate, one leads to a hidden bag. This way no one knows
who injected the lethal dose.
Joseph Neff, Killer's BizarreExecution RequstDenied,RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVmR,Jan. 21,
1995, atA3; see also GRAY & STANLEY, supra note 85, at 23 (describing hanging arrangements in which "there are three men in a booth on the platform, each of whom cuts a
string at the hangman's signal, [but] only one of [whom] ... springs the trapdoor");
TROMBLEY, supra note 83, at 11, 74-75, 106 (describing the use of one blank by firing
squads and dummy pulls as parts of lethal injection machines). The point of such
systems is to leave uncertainty as to who killed, not only in the minds of spectators, but
in the minds of executioners as well. As one former warden explained it, "You have
two manual pulls, and one is a dummy pull. Both have got the same size spring on
them, so the person pulling doesn't feel anything different.'" Id. at 106 (interview
with Bill Armontrout, former warden of the Missouri State Penitentiary).
89 As Justice Brennan writes:
Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a human
being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity. The contrast with the plight of a person punished by imprisonment is evident ....
A prisoner remains a member of the human
family. ... As one 19th century proponent of punishing criminals by death
declared, "When a man is hung, there is an end of our relations with him.
His execution is a way of saying, 'You are not fit for this world, take your
chances elsewhere.'"
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bolic "casting out."90 When we think of a case that merits death, we
do not think of the case as one that simply involves the having of rules
and the breaking of rules; for if that is-truly-all that it involves,
then the condemned person is not really so different from ourselves.
In order to kill another human being in a cool, deliberate, and dispassionate manner, we cannot see him so simply. We must see him not as
a person who has done evil, but as someone who is possessed by evil. We
must break the tie of kinship. We must create a chasm between him
and ourselves.
For this psychological tie to be successfully broken-for the break
in kinship for which it strives to be complete-the decision to kill
must be felt, in its great weight, by the one who makes it. The gravity
involved in the act of killing must be matched by the gravity involved
in the decision to kill. Conscience-that idea which captures and reminds us of our moral connection to others91-must now be used to
sever the human tie. The decision to kill must be a decision of personalmoral agency. It must leave someone with "blood on his hands."
It is in its struggle to account for this deep need in death decisions that the apparent incoherence in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence lies. What has been called a conflict between the presence of
discretion and the absence of it, 9 2 or between the use of emotion and
the prohibition of it, 9 3 is really something else. It is the conflict beFurman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Stephen, CapitalPunishments, 69 FRASER'S MAGAZINE 753, 763 (1864)). As Robert Cover
noted, "Not even the facade of civility ... can obscure the violence of a death sentence." Cover, supra note 6, at 1623.
90 See Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305, 393 (describing the "inevitably unsystematic, irreducibly personal moral element of the choice to
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subjects to administer electric shocks to supposed "victims" depended upon the
breaking of psychological identification between the two).
91

In most usages, conscience only has meaning-indeed, moral agency only has

meaning-in the context of the consideration of the self with others.
MAGUIRE, THE MORAL CHOICE 379 (1978) (stating that conscience "is not

See DANIEL
a center of

moral judgment which is atomistically cut off from other centers"; it "lives in dialogue
and mirrors our social nature"); Elizabeth Kiss, Conscience and Moral Psychology: Reflec-

tions on Thomas Hill's "FourConceptions of Conscience," in NoMos XL: INTEG~rIY AND
CONSCIENCE, supra note 25, at 69, 72-73 (describing conscience as involving a "moral
connection to," or an "emotional capacity to empathize with," others).
92 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
93 Compare Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990) (stating that sentences of
death should turn on "a reasoned moral response, ... rather than an emotional one")
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tween agentic and conscientic models of law; it is the conflict between
our belief in the rule of law, under whose authority decisionmakers
detachedly enforce law made by others, and our fear (in these cases)
that we must cross a moral boundary, that a human being must be
personally and morally responsible for this act. Moral decisionmaking, of the kind that the Court instinctively perceives to be necessary
in these cases, conflicts with our deepest beliefs about the nature, purpose, and function of law. The Court is caught in a place of twilight,
in which the nature of the law-under whose authority an act is
done-cannot be reconciled with the nature of the act.
Although the death penalty cases might be the most extreme examples of this conflict, they are not the only ones in law. There are
other cases in which we feel that the bonds of human kinship have
been betrayed or broken, and that the decisionmakers involved must
be personally accountable for their acts. They are the cases whose
decisions cause us instinctively to cry out, who did this? Who deported
this person to torture or death? Who returned this child to abusive
parents who killed her? Who is responsible for this decision?9 4 These
are cases in which the agentic nature of law fails; cases in which the
answer that law was followed is not enough; cases in which justice, as
we intuitively know it, requires another, more personal calculation.
Such cases are admittedly rare in law-as, indeed, they should be.
Whether conscientic decisionmaking is an explicit part of law, or is
something that we (as a society) require in spite of law, it carries a
distinct cost for other values. With personal responsibility comes personal authority; with personal authority comes not only the possibility
of justice, but the possibility of erratic judgments, standardless decisionmaking, and the use of factors that we-as a society-abhor. 95
The idea of law as agentic in nature is powerful, and deservedly so; it is
only in rare cases that the magnitude of the act or its consequences
for others cause us to abandon the agentic model and demand the
conscientic one.
(quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)), with id. at 513 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "sympathy," and the emotions it involves, are "important ingredient[s] in the Eighth Amendment's requirement of an individualized sentencing
determination").
94 We ask these questions today when confronting the enforcement of slave laws
in our history. See ROBERT CoVER, JusncE AccusED: ANTiSiAvERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 197-256 (1975) (exploring the refusal of most antebellumjudges to face the
moral dimensions of their actions in slavery cases).
95 As Professor Greenawalt has written in a slightly different context, "juriesmay
nullify for bad reasons as well as good, and no one has yet thought of a formula that
would produce nullification only in deserving cases." Greenawalt, supra note 5, at
230.
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But rare as these cases are, they serve a vital function. They remind us that we are, in the end, personalactors in law, as in life; and
that justice cannot always be captured by the judgments of others.
They remind us that when we deny the humanity of others, we should
feel the prick of doubt, the sickness of conscience. They remind us of
the existence of human frailty, and the certainty of human error.
They are the times when we cannot comfort ourselves with murmurs
of agentic roles. They are the small spaces left, in law, for personal
moral inquiry.

